We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the minimal quality of the kidney they may receive. Under feasibility constraints, patients' truthful revelation of reservation values is incompatible with constrained efficiency. In the light of this result, we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption on patients' incentives. Patients choose their revelation strategies as to "protect" themselves from bad outcomes and use a lexicographic refinement of maximin strategies. In this environment, if exchanges are pairwise, then priority rules or rules that maximize a fixed ordering provide incentives for the patients to report their true reservation values. The positive result vanishes if larger exchanges are admitted. Abstract We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the minimal quality of the kidney they may receive. Under feasibility constraints, patients' truthful revelation of reservation values is incompatible with constrained efficiency. * We are grateful to Bettina Klaus and Alvin Roth for insightful comments and discussions. We would also like to thank seminar audiences at the Universities of Vigo, York, and Warwick as well as the
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In the light of this result, we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption on patients' incentives. Patients choose their revelation strategies as to "protect" themselves of bad outcomes and use a lexicographic refinement of maximin strategies.
In this environment, if exchanges are pairwise, then priority rules or rules that maximize a fixed ordering provide incentives for the patients to report their true reservation values. The positive result vanishes if larger exchanges are admitted.
Introduction
In the past decade economists have become increasingly more involved in the design of markets/practical mechanisms (labor market clearinghouses, Roth 2002; power markets, Wilson 2002 ; school choice, Sönmez 1999, 2003) . With the recent seminal paper by Roth et al. (2004) , the theory of mechanism design has found an important application in the design and implementation of matching mechanisms (rules) to allocate organs for transplantation. The complexity of institutional and feasibility constraints, the normative implications and the effects on patients' lives make the task of designing optimal rules a fascinating challenge.
The best treatment for end-stage kidney failure is kidney transplantation. Kidneys available for transplantation may be obtained from deceased donors or from willing living donors. In October 2008, more than 400,000 people in the US are being treated for end-stage kidney failure, and more than 76,000 are listed for a deceased donor kidney transplant. In 2007, there were 16628 kidney transplants in the US, 6041 of those transplants were from living donors.
1 Unfortunately, a donated kidney may be unsuitable for transplantation (incompatible) to a given patient because the mismatch between donor and patient blood types and tissues would lead to the immediate rejection and loss of the graft.
In recent years, there has been many proposals to alleviate the (universal) shortage of kidneys. Some authors as Becker and Elias (2002) present arguments favoring a market approach, but the medical community is firmly opposed to the application of monetary Roth et al. (2004) suggest that the benefits of such an exchange could be very substantial, increasing live organ donations between unrelated donors from about 54% to as much as 91% if exchanges among multiple couples are feasible, and to as much as 75%
even if only pairwise exchanges are feasible. In this environment a Central Transplant
Coordinator (CTC) uses kidney assignment rules that taking into account the medical details of the patients and donors involved in the possible exchanges, propose compatible exchanges among the couples. A key issue when designing these rules is that they should not provide incentives for the patients to lie about their medical details in order to improve their chances of getting a match as good as possible.
In subsequent work, Roth et al. (2005a) have proposed a mechanism design approach to KPE that encompasses the specific features and institutional detail of New England. simultaneously, Roth et al. (2005a) consider that only pairwise exchanges between two donor-patient pairs are feasible. In fact, they prove that priority rules used in real life ensure that it is a dominant strategy for patients to truthfully reveal both the set of donors they can receive a kidney from and the set of patientes that their donors can donate a kidney to. Hatfield (2005) shows that the results are robust to arbitrary feasibility constraints. More recently, Saidman et al. (2006) and Roth et al. (2007) show that efficiency gains could be attained (and almost exhausted) if kidney exchanges among three donor-patient couples and LPE were admitted. Sönmez and Unver (2005) ; Roth et al. (2006) also analyze the potential benefits of altruistic no-related -Samaritandonors in LPE. 7 See Duquesnoy et al. (2003) , Merion et al. (2005) , Keizer et al. (2005) , Klerk et al. (2004 ), Opelz (1997 , Kranenburg et al. (2004), and Schnitzler et al. (1999) . 
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the CTC and need not to be elicited.
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(ii) Patients are endowed with a reservation value over the minimal quality of the donorpatient match required to accept a transplantation. The choice of receiving a given kidney or continuing the dialysis treatment depends in fact on patient's eagerness to receive an organ instead of continuing the dialysis and waiting for a better kidney. Hence, each patient reservation value depends on how the patient subjectively evaluates the quality of life under dialysis, her expectations about the quality of future pools of kidneys available for exchange, and on her attitude towards risk and uncertainty. 10 Of course, patients reservation values are not observable and remain private information.
In this scenario, we investigate whether we can construct rules such that revealing the true reservation value is a dominant strategy for the patients. Surprisingly, we show that in the presence of feasibility constraints, truthful revelation is not compatible with a weak version of efficiency.
In the light of the negative result that we obtain in the standard model, we propose an alternative "behavioral" approach. KPE programs normally involve the coordination of nephrology services and patients of several hospitals. In this environment, patients have little information about the remaining patients involved in the program. Patients may consider that by misreporting their own reservation values, they also could end up losing the possibility of a beneficial transplant. In fact, they could even receive an undesirable kidney. Therefore, it becomes natural to assume that patients might prefer to choose their strategies so as to "protect" themselves from the worst eventuality as far as possible. We capture formally this "lexicographic maximin" behavior assumption with the notion of' "protective behavior" proposed by Barberà and Dutta (1982) and later axiomatized by Barberà and Jackson (1988) . With his assumption on patients' strategic 9 A possible problem is that, even doctors could be tempted to report strategically these information to the CTC in order to favor their own patients. This is the justification for the approach in Roth et al. (2004) . The problem seems less relevant for European continental countries, where Transplant Services are normally public and have more information and less coordination problems that those in US. 10 The existence of patients' reservation values is consistent with the existence of Extended Donor Criteria and the use of organs previously regarded as unsuitable, because improvements on immunosuppressive treatment imply that even those low quality organs have good probability of survival. See Su et al. (2004) ; Su and Zenios (2006) .
behavior, we reconcile the notion that patients only care about obtaining a kidney in so far it is compatible with the evidence on the heterogeneity of compatible kidneys.
In this scenario, we show that truthful revelation of patients reservation values can be attained despite the feasibility constraints. If kidney exchanges are restricted to involve only pairs of donor-patient couples, then a plethora of rules provide (strong) incentives for the patients to report their true reservation values. This is the case for priority rules or rules that maximize a fixed ordering over the set of feasible and individually rational kidney assignments. The positive result vanishes however, if larger exchanges are admitted. There are kidney allocation problems where if 3-way exchanges are feasible, then truth-telling is a protectively dominated strategy. Thus, in some sense, our results justify the possibility of introducing a pairwise kidney exchange in Europe, but also provide additional theoretical support beyond the logistic reasons for concentrating on the possibilities that arise in pairwise exchanges.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the model of kidney allocation problems and basic notation. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of kidney asignment rules and some desirable conditions. In Section, 4 we present an introductory impossibility result. In Section 5, we define the protective behavior and present the positive results. In Section 6, we conclude and discuss lines of further research.
Kidney Assignment Problems
Consider a finite society consisting of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of patients (n > 3) who need a kidney for transplantation. Each patient has a potential donor, and Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 , . . . , ω n } denotes the set of kidneys available for transplantation. The kidney ω 0 refers to the situation in which a patient does not receive any kidney, while ω i for each i = 0 refers to the kidney of patient i's donor. We assume that each patient has only one potential donor and that there are not kidneys without living donor.
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Each patient i is equipped with a complete and transitive preference relation i on Ω.
Patients' preferences are based on rankings expressed through objective, medical criteria that measure the fitness of each available kidney to each patient and that are observable by 11 Hence, we focus on KPE. We discuss in the concluding section the possibility of multiple donors.
6 the CTC. 12 We express patients' preferences by using numerical valuations over kidneys.
For each i, j ∈ N , we denote by v i (ω j ) i's valuation of kidney ω j . For each i ∈ N , ω, ω ∈ Ω, we say patient i considers kidney ω at least as good as kidney ω , ω i ω , if and only if v i (ω) ≥ v i (ω ). Of course, given i the associated strict preference relation i and the indifference relation ∼ i are defined in the standard way. We normalize in such a way that for each i ∈ N , and each ω ∈ Ω \ {ω 0 }, v i (ω) ∈ [0, 1). If for some i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω v i (ω) = 0, we say that patient i and kidney ω are incompatible. This reflects the possibility that patient i's body will reject the graft of kidney ω, because of bloodtype incompatibility, positive crossmatch, or any other reason. We say that patient i and kidney ω are compatible if v i (ω) > 0.We assume that agents have strict preferences over compatible kidneys, and therefore for each i ∈ N and each ω, ω ∈ Ω if v i (ω) = 0 and
A preference profile is a matrix P ∈ M n×n and it is defined by P i,j ≡ v j (ω i ) for each i, j ∈ N . Preference profiles contain all the information about patients' observable priority rankings.
Each patient i is also endowed with a reservation value r i ∈ (0, 1). We interpret r i as the valuation that patient i assigns to receive ω 0 . Hence, r i ≡ v i (ω 0 ). Reservation values may incorporate patients' subjective valuation of being on dialysis and not receiving any kidney, as well as the endogenous expectation of receiving a new organ in the future from a new pool of donor-patient couples. We assume that for each patient i, r i > 0.
Thus, patients always prefer to stay on dialysis rather than receiving an incompatible kidney. In order to be consistent with our assumption on strict preferences for compatible kidneys, we assume that patients are never indifferent between receiving a kidney and not receiving a kidney and remaining on the waiting list. Thus, for each i and each
. Given a patient i and a preference profile P, we denote by
s reservation values that are consistent with P. 13 Let R ≡ × i∈N R i . We call r ∈ R patients' reservation values profile. For each i ∈ N and each r ∈ R, r −i denotes the restriction of r to the patients in N \ {i}.
A (kidney exchange) problem K is a pair K = (P, r).
12 These rankings may be based on the LYFT index -Life Years From Transplantation-or any other quality-efficiency criteria. 13 The reader should keep in mind that R i depends on P. We are abusing notation but since P is always a primitive of the analysis, there will not be room for confusion in the arguments.
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An assignment a is an n-tuple of pairs a = [(1, ω), . . . , (n, ω )] such that
An assignment is an allocation of the available kidneys to the patients. By (i), an assignment never allocates the same kidney to two different patients, unless that kidney is the null kidney. By (ii), if the kidney of a patient's donor is assigned to another patient, then the initial patient is not assigned the null kidney. For each patient i and each assignment a, we denote by a i the kidney that patient i receives at a.
In every assignment, kidneys are allocated by forming exchange cycles of patientdonors couples. In each exchange cycle, every patient receives a kidney from the donor of some patient in the cycle and simultaneously her donor's kidney is transplanted to another patient in the cycle. In an exchange cycle among k couples, all the kidneys must be reaped from the donors and transplanted to the patients simultaneously. If this constraint is not taken into account, once a donor's kidney is transplanted to another patient, the donor of the recipient may reject to donate her kidney in order to avoid any clinical complication involved in the operation. This fact implies that an assignment among k couples involves 2k simultaneous operations. Since hospitals face evident logistic restrictions, we incorporate such constraints in our analysis through a narrower definition of feasible assignments.
For each assignment a, let π a be the finest partition of the set of patients such that for each p ∈ π a and each i ∈ p:
(i) either there are j, j ∈ p, with a i = ω j and a j = ω i ,
14
(ii) or a i = ω 0 .
Clearly, for each assignment a the partition π a is unique and well-defined. We define the cardinality of a as the max p∈πa #p.
The cardinality of an assignment refers to the size of the largest exchange cycle formed in the assignment. Basically, it refers to the maximum number of simultaneous operations 14 Note that j = j and i = j = j and then a i = ω i are allowed.
8 involved in an assignment. Of course, the concept of cardinality is crucial for our notion of feasibility.
For each k ∈ N, k ≤ n, we say that the assignment a is k-feasible if a's cardinality is not larger than k. Let A k be the set of all k-feasible assignments.
An interesting case of feasibility restrictions appears when only immediate exchanges between two couples are admitted. An assignment a is a pairwise-exchange assignment
3 Kidney Assignment Rules
In this paper, we are interested in rules that select a (kidney) assignment for each (kidney exchange) problem. An (assignment) rule is a mapping ϕ that selects an assignment a for each problem K. For each patient i and each problem K = (P, r), we denote by ϕ i (P, r) the kidney assigned to i by ϕ at K. As we take patients' preferences profile P as given, whenever there is no room for confusion, we drop P from the arguments and simply write ϕ(r).
The assignment selected by a rule can be interpreted as an optimal recommendation that takes into account the preferences of the patients for the available kidneys and their reservation values and that tries to find a compromise between their (maybe conflicting)
interests.
Every preference profile P together with a rule ϕ define a revelation mechanism.
The revelation mechanism (or game form) specifies a set of players (the patients), a set of strategies for each patient, the sets R i that are consistent with P; and an outcome function, ϕ(P, ·). Note that the mechanism (P, ϕ) fails short of defining a game in normal (strategic) form because P does not introduce the information about patients' preferences about the possibility of receiving the null kidney ω 0 .
Next, we present formal definition of the standard conditions for desirable rules. The reader should keep in mind that all the conditions refer to a given observed preference profile P.
Individual Rationality. For each i ∈ N and each r ∈ R,
k-Efficiency. For each r ∈ R, ϕ(r) ∈ A k and there is no a ∈ A k such that for each i ∈ N a i i ϕ i (r) and for some j ∈ N , a j j ϕ j (P, r).
Individual rationality is a minimal participation constraint which takes into account patient's right of refusing any transplant and receiving her donor's kidney. On the other hand, k-efficiency is the natural version of efficiency taking into account the feasibility restrictions on the cardinality of the assignments because at most 2k simultaneous operations can be carried out in the kidney exchange process. Of course, n-efficiency corresponds to the classical notion of (full) Pareto efficiency when there are not feasibility constraints.
Incentive-Compatibility and Feasibility Constraints
A central issue in the design of an optimal kidney exchange program is the use of all the relevant information in the assignment of the available kidneys. Although doctors may have all the information about the degree of compatibility and fitness among patients and kidneys that is imbedded in preference profiles, there is a key piece of information that remains private information for the patients and must be elicited for public use, their reservation values. The objective of this section is to analyze whether we can construct rule s that provide incentives to the patients to reveal their true reservation values in the presence of feasibility constraints on the cardinality of the proposed assignments.
We are interested in rules that provide incentives for the patients to reveal their true reservation values in all the games induced by the revelation mechanism (P, ϕ).
Strategy-proofness. For each i ∈ N , each r ∈ R, and each
Strategy-proofness implies that reporting the true reservation value is a (weakly) dominant strategy for every patient in all the games compatible with the revelation mechanism y P and ϕ. Note that strategy-proofness is weak in our framework because only reservation values are private information. The justification for the requirements of strategy-proofness is two-fold. On the normative side, if patients do not provide the correct reservation values, then the assignment selected by the rule may be based on incorrect information, and therefore it may represent a far from optimal recommendation to the society. On the positive side, in order to compute patients' best strategies in the revelation game induced by P and ϕ, patients simply need to know their own reservation values.
The literature on the allocation of indivisible objects has extensively studied the problem of designing strategy-proof and individually rational assignment rules. Give each patient in a top trading cycle her best preferred kidney, and remove them from the problem with her assigned kidney. Repeat the process until each patient receives a kidney (maybe the null kidney). The resulting assignment is unique given that preferences over compatible kidneys are strict. 16 Moreover, the induced rule satisfies individual rationality, n-efficiency, and strategy-proofness. , and for each i ∈ N , r i = 0.9. In this problem, the top trading cycle procedure selects the
15 See Gale and Shapley (1962) ; Shapley and Scarf (1974) ; Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) . 16 Patients will rather pick the null kidney rather than receiving an incompatible kidney. 17 See Roth and Postlewaite (1977) ; Roth (1982) .
Underā, there is a top trading cycle that involves all the patients and every patient receives her best preferred kidney. Every rule that satisfies individual rationality and 3-efficiency however, selects the assignment
Clearly, for each i ∈ N ,ā i i a 2 andā 2 2 a 2 butā is not 3-feasible.
Our first result shows that feasibility constraints may make it impossible to construct efficient rules that provide the right incentives to the patients at every preference profile.
Theorem 1. For each 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, there are P such that no rule satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and strategy-proofness.
Proof. We study two cases. We analyze first the restriction to pairwise exchanges. Then, we provide the proof for k ≥ 3. In both cases we exploit arguments similar to those employed in the literature of strategy-proof assignment rules in economies with indivisibilities where the core is empty (k = 2) or multi-valued (k ≥ 3).
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Assume to the contrary there is a rule ϕ that satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness for every P. Consider three patients {1, 2, 3} and a preference profile P such that its restriction to these patients and their donors' kidneys is: and so that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and each ω / ∈ {ω 0 , ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, v i (ω) = 0. Thus, ω 2 1 ω 3 1 ω 1 , ω 3 2 ω 1 2 ω 2 , and ω 1 3 ω 2 3 ω 3 . In order to simplify notation, let N = {1, 2, 3}. (By individual rationality, this is without loss of generality.)
Let r = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) = (0.6, 0.6, 0.6). By individual rationality and 2-efficiency, ϕ selects an assignment in which two patients exchange their donors' kidneys while the remaining patient receives the null kidney. We assume without loss of generality that
Next, let r = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) = (0.9, 0.6, 0.6). By strategy-proofness, ϕ 1 (r ) = ω 2 . Finally, let r = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) = (0.9, 0.9, 0.6). By individual rationality and strategy-proofness,
Note that the assignment a = 18 See Sönmez (1999) .
[(1, ω 0 ), (2, ω 3 ), (3, ω 2 )] is 2-feasible, and a i i ϕ i (r ) for each i ∈ N and a 2 2 ϕ 2 (r ).
Then, ϕ violates 2-efficiency.
Next, we analyze the general case. Let k ≥ 3. Remember that k < n and then there are at least k +1 patients. Assume to the contrary there is a rule ϕ that satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and strategy-proofness for every P. Let the preference profile P be such that for every i = 1 . . . , k + 1:
Again, (by individual rationality, without loss of generality) simplify notation and let
. . . Let r ∈ R be such that:
Note that, by individual rationality either no object is assigned to any patient 1, . . . , k+ 1, or patient k + 1 receives ω 2 , patient 1 receives the null object, and every other patient i receives ω i+1 (the kidney of her next to the right neighbor). By k-efficiency:
Let r ∈ R be such that for each i = k −1, r i = r i and v k−1 (ω k−1 ) < r k−1 < v k−1 (ω k+1 ).
By strategy-proofness, ϕ k−1 (r ) k−1 ϕ k−1 (r) = ω k . Note that ω k is patient k−1's preferred kidney. Then, ϕ k−1 (r ) = ω k . By k-efficiency and individual rationality, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r ).
Letr ∈ R be such that for each i = k + 1, r i =r i and v k+1 (ω 2 ) <r k+1 < v k+1 (ω 1 ).
The same arguments we employed to determine ϕ(r) apply here to obtain:
Note that ω 1 = ϕ k+1 (r) = ϕ(r k+1 , r −(k+1) ) k+1 ϕ k+1 (r ) = ω 2 , which contradicts strategyproofness.
The previous impossibility result is robust to the introduction of weak preferences over kidneys. All we require is to admit the existence of two indifference classes for acceptable kidneys. Hence, Theorem 1 contrasts with the positive results in dichotomous domains of preferences by Roth et al. (2005a) and Hatfield (2005) . Moreover, the result can be extended to incomplete information settings where patients may have incomplete information (i.e. beliefs) about the reservaton values of the remaining patients. In a result that parallels the results of Roth (1989) , we can prove that there are preference profiles and sets of patients' beliefs about other patients' reservation values such that there is no rule that satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and (Bayesian) incentive compatibility.
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Protective Behavior in Kidney Exchange Problems
The previous section presents a negative result for kidney assignment rules. This negative result is particularly discouraging since we balance the enrichment of preference domain with the increase in the information available to the CTC. Namely, we make the assumption that patients' preferences over available kidneys are known by the CTC because they depend on measurable and verifiable characteristics of patients and donors, like blood types of patients and donors, their age, health status, race, HLA mismatches, etc. The fact that reservation values depend on unobservable patients' characteristics however, introduces severe limitation on the properties that the kidney assignment rules 19 A precise statement of this result can be found in Appendix A. In a recent paper, Villa and Patrone (2008) prove that the rule that maximizes the sum of the welfare of the patients is not incentive compatible.
may satisfy. Thus, information on the patients' reservation values have to be elicited and patients might be tempted to misreport such information to get better kidneys. In this scenario, if patients waiting for a transplant are strongly risk-averse, they might prefer to choose their strategies so as to "protect" themselves from the worst eventuality as far as possible. This "lexicographic maximin" behavior assumption is captured by the notion of "protective behavior".
Consider a preference profile P, a rule ϕ and a patient i who faces the revelation mechanism (game form) defined by (P, ϕ).
20
For each patient i, each pair of reservation values r i , s i ∈ R i , and each real number l ∈ R, let:
Then, c r i (l, s i , ) is the set of restricted profiles of reservation values of the remaining patients under which i receives a kidney ω with v i (ω) = l when i announces s i and her true reservation value is r i .
Given P and ϕ, for each patient i with reservation value r i ∈ R i , s i , s i ∈ R i , s i protectively dominates s i , denoted s i d(r i ) s i if there exists l ∈ R such that:
For each patient i and each r i ∈ R i , let D(r i ) ≡ {s i ∈ R i | there is no s i ∈ R i with s i d(r i ) s i } be the set of protective strategies of patient i.
In order to compare two strategies according to this criterion an agent looks at the utility level of the worst outcome (say t = min ω∈Ω v i (ω)). Strategy s i protectively dominates s i if two conditions hold. First, it never occurs that there exists a profile such that 20 Throughout this section, we assume that all the information available to the CTC, namely P and ϕ is also available to the patients. The results are not altered however, if we only assume that patients have information about the set of mutually compatible exchanges and not the whole preference profile P.
We maintain the assumption on common knowledge of preference profiles just for the sake of clarity of exposition and to avoid the introduction of additional notation. We delay the discussion on the incomplete information case where patients only know her own preferences and reservation values to the end of this section.
strategy s i induces this minimum utility level and strategy s i induces a higher level of utility. Second, there are some profiles such that s i induces the minimum level of utility, while s i induces a larger payoff for patient i. If the first condition holds but not the second because c r i (t, s i ) = c r i (t, s i ), then patient i repeats the comparison with respect to the next to the worst utility level.
Clearly, the protective domination relation is not complete, but it is transitive. Thus, for each reservation value r i ∈ R i , the set D(r i ) is not empty. Moreover, if there is a unique protective strategy,
Truth-telling requires that reporting the true reservation value is a protective strategy for the player at every direct revelation game generated by P and ϕ. Protective domination however, is not a complete relation. Thus, if there are several different protective strategies besides reporting the true value, then we could not say that truth-telling is an optimal strategy for the patients. This fact calls for a stronger implementability requirement.
Let r,r ∈ R. The reservation values profiler is a protective equilibrium at r iff for each patient i,r i ∈ D(r i ).
A rule ϕ is directly implementable via protective equilibria (DIPE) iff for each r,r ∈ R such thatr is a protective equilibrium at r, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r).
With our focus on DIPE rules, we emphatize that there is no a priori reason why implementation of rules should be achieved through equilibria involving truthful preference revelation. In fact, focusing on the implementability of rules reflects the consideration that correct revelation is not an objective per se, and what we really care about is the result of strategic behavior, rather than its correspondence to truth. The following result indicates, however, that the only rules which are implementable in our sense are those which in fact guarantee truthful revelation by all patients, under the behavioral and informational assumptions underlying the definition of protective equilibrium.
For each patient i, strategies s i , s i ∈ R i are equivalent if for each s −i ∈ R −i ,
Truth-telling is (essentially) the unique protective strategy for patient i if for each r i ∈ R i , D(r i ) = {r i | r i and r i are equivalent} .
Our first result in this section replicates Theorem 1 in Barberà and Dutta (1982) .
Proposition 1. Let P ∈ P. A rule ϕ is directly implementable via protective equilibria if and only if for each patient i, truth-telling is essentially the unique protective strategy .
The proof of Proposition 1 mimics the proof Theorem 1 in Barberà and Dutta (1982) , and it is relegated to the Appendix. The proof consists of three steps. First, we prove that the set of undominated strategies for non-equivalent reservation values (strategies)
are disjoint. Then, we show reservation values with the same sets of admissible kidneys are equivalent. Finally, we check that revealing the true reservation value is indeed an undominated strategy.
The following example shows that the difference between truth-telling as a unique protective strategy and strategy-proofness. There are profiles for which no rule satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness, but there exist rules that satisfy individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and such that truth-telling is the unique protective strategy. Assume that r 2 < 0.75, then for each s 2 < 0.75, s 2 is strategically equivalent to r 2 .
Moreover, for each s 2 > 0.75, c r 2 (r 2 , r 2 ) c r 2 (r 2 , s 2 ). Using a similar argument for r 2 > 0.75, we can prove that truth-telling is (essentially) the unique protective strategy for patient 2 . The same reasoning applies to the remaining patients, and therefore ψ is DIPE. On the other hand, It is immediate to check that ψ violates strategy-proofness.
Notice that the violation of strategy-proofness appears for reservation values profile where patient 2 is nor receiving her worst preferred outcome.
In order to follow with the analysis of truth-telling as a protective strategy, we need to introduce additional notation and definitions. Consider a patient i, (given P and ϕ) the set of possible outcomes for patient i a is defined by:
Ω i ≡ {ω ∈ Ω such that there exists r ∈ R with ϕ i (r) = ω}.
With the definition of Ω i at hand, for each problem reservation value r i ∈ R i the set of acceptable kidneys for i is defined as:
Of course, i's set of unacceptable kidneys is analogously defined: At this point, we introduce two conditions that turn out to be necessary for truthtelling being a unique protective strategy in our environment.
Invariance. For each patient i, and each pair r, r ∈ R such that
Weak Consistency. For each i ∈ N , each r ∈ R, and each r i ∈ R i , if ϕ i (r) = ω 0 and r i < r i , then ϕ i (r i , r −i ) = ω 0 .
Invariance requires that if a patient changes her reported reservation value, but this change does not affect her set of acceptable kidneys, then the patient receives the same kidney. Note that a rule satisfying invariance may be responsive to the cardinal information of patients' reported reservation values. For instance, think of a serially dictatorial (priority) rule that always picks the best feasible allocation for a given patient, and then proceeds iteratively (serially breaking ties) according to a priority list that depends on the reservation value reported by that first patient on the list. Weak Consistency is a convenient weakening of the Axiom of Choice for single-valued choice functions.
21 Simply, if a patient does not receive a kidney when she reports r i , then she cannot be assigned to a compatible kidney when she raises her reservation value. Note that if a rule satisfies individual rationality, then weak consistency applies the logic behind the Axiom of Choice only at situations where the patients receive the worst possible outcome, the null kidney.
Proposition 2. For each preference profile P and each rule ϕ, if ϕ satisfies individual rationality and for each patient i truth telling is the unique protective strategy, then ϕ satisfies invariance and weak consistency.
Proof. Let i ∈ N . We start with the proof of invariance. Assume first that r i < v i (ω i ). In this case, Ω − i (r i ) = ∅ and we need to prove that every
telling is the unique protective strategy for patient i, c
ϕ (s i ,r −i ) = ω i . Next, assume that i's true reservation value is s i and letr −i ∈ × j =i R j be such that ϕ (s i ,r −i ) = ω i . Repeating the previous argument, individual rationality and the fact that truth-telling is the unique protective strategy for i, imply that c
, r i ), and ϕ (r i ,r −i ) = ω i . Applying the same argument iteratively for each level k > r i , we conclude that r i and s i are equivalent.
Next, assume that r i > v i (ω i ) and that Ω − i (r i ) = ∅. 22 Hence, we need to check that every s i ∈ R i such that
By individual rationality and the
Because truth-telling is the unique protective strategy for patient i, c r i (r i , r i ) ⊆ c r i (r i , s i ), and ϕ (s i ,r −i ) = ω 0 . Next assume that i's true reservation value is s i and letr −i ∈ × j =i R j be such that ϕ (s i ,r −i ) = ω 0 . Repeating the previous argument, individual rationality and the fact that truth-telling is the unique protective strategy for i imply that c
, and ϕ (r i ,r −i ) = ω 0 . Applying the arguments of the previous paragraph iteratively for each level k > r i , we conclude that r i and s i are equivalent. Finally note that the same argument suffices to prove that
and Ω − i (r i ) = ∅, which completes the proof of invariance.
We conclude with the proof of weak consistency. Note that by individual rationality,
Assume that ϕ does not satisfy weak consistency, then there are i ∈ N , and r i < r i such that
there is r ∈ R with r i > r i such that ϕ i (r i , r −i ) = ω 0 but ϕ i (r ) = ω 0 . By individual rationality, ϕ i (r ) ∈ Ω + i (r i )\{ω 0 }. Hence, by (i) of the definition of protective domination, r i does not protectively dominates r i . Moreover, r i and r i are not equivalent strategies.
These facts contradict that truth-telling is essentially the unique protective strategy.
The next proposition shows that invariance and weak consistency are also sufficient if only pairwise exchanges are admitted.
Proposition 3. For each preference profile P, if the rule ϕ satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, invariance, and weak consistency, then for each patient i truth-telling is the unique protective strategy.
22 By individual rationality, this is always the case if v i (ω i ) = 0.
Proof. Fix a patient i and a reservation value r i ∈ R i . By invariance, we need only prove that r i protectively dominates every strategy
Clearly, for each t ≤ r i and each t > t, c r i (t, r i ) ∩ c r i (t , s i ) = ∅, which proves the (ii) of protective domination. Next, considerr ∈ R such thatr i = s i and for each patient j = i and each
Next, assume that r i > v i (ω i ) and assume that ω
23 Consider the reservation values profile r ∈ R such that r i = s i , for each l / ∈ {i, j} and each
This suffices to prove that r i protectively dominates s i .
We conclude by checking that if r i > v i (ω i ), then r i protectively dominates every
By individual rationality, for each t < r i , c r i i (t, r i ) = ∅. Note that for each r * ∈ R such that r * i = r i and ϕ i (r * ) = ω 0 , and for each s i > r i , by weak consistency, ϕ i (s i , r * −i ) = ω 0 . Then, for each t > r i we have c r i (r i , r i )∩c r i (t , s i ) = ∅ which proves condition (i) of the definition of protective domination. The previous argument implies that c r i (r i , r i ) ⊆ c r i (r i , s i ). In order to conclude the argument, we show that the previous inclusion is proper. Let j ∈ N be such that ω + (r i ) = ω j . Consider the reservation values profile r ∈ R such that r i = s i , v j (ω i ) > r j , and for each m / ∈ {i, j} and each Proposition 4. Let ϕ be a rule that satisfies individual rationality and k-efficiency for some k ≥ 3. There are preference profiles P such that if for some r ∈ R #ϕ(r) > 2 then for some patient i r i / ∈ D(r i ).
Proof. Consider the following counterexample. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let the preference profile P be such that Let the rule ϕ satisfy individual rationality and 3-efficiency. Individual rationality and 3-efficiency imply that ϕ is defined according to Table 2 and Table 3 .
r 2 \ r 3 r 3 > 0.9 r 3 ∈ (0.75, 0.9) r 3 < 0.75 24 This is the case for the preference profile presented in the proof of the case k = 2 of Theorem 1.
r 2 \ r 3 r 3 > 0.9 r 3 ∈ (0.75, 0.9) r 3 < 0.75 Assume now that there is r ∈ R such that #ϕ(r ) = 3. That is, there is r such that ϕ(r) = [(1, ω 2 ), (2, ω 3 ), (3, ω 1 )]. Necessarily, r 1 < 0.9, r 2 < 0.9, and r 3 < 0. If patient 3 reservation value is r 3 , then s 3 = 0.8 protectively dominates r 3 . In this case, by reporting s 3 = 0.8, patient 3 is not taking any risk at the other patients' profiles for which she receives the null kidney. In the case of receiving an acceptable kidney however, by reporting s 3 = 0.8 she always gets her best preferred kidney. Interestingly, we have to move beyond the first round of comparisons between strategies to check domination.
Proposition 4 implies that at some preference profiles rules individual rationality and k-efficiency, it is necessary to introduce limits on the cardinality of the recommended exchanges in order to provide incentives for the patients to reveal their true reservation values. The problem affects reasonable rules like priority rules and every rule that maximizes the number of (individually rational) exchanges. Hence, Proposition 3 provides a strategic rationale for the focus on pairwise exchanges. Besides the logistic and direct incentives problems described by Roth et al. (2005a) , the restriction to pairwise exchanges may be necessary to obtain the correct information from the patients in the protective behavior scenario.
Two final remarks are in order.
Proposition 4 depends crucially on the information available to the patients. In the light of the proof, it is clear that it is not necessary that the patients have perfect knowledge of the prefernece profile P. It suffices that the patients know the sets of compatible kidneys of the remaining patients. If each patient only has information about her own preferences, then the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3 would apply to prove a general version of Proposition 3. In such incomplete information framework, for each k ≤ n, if a rule ϕ satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, invariance, and weak consistency, then ϕ is DIPE.
Finally, in this article we have focused on situations where each patient has only one possible donor. When patients can have multiple donors, it could be possible that a patient may have incentives to withdraw some of her possible donors if by doing so the assignment rule assigns her a better kidney. Again, with slight modifications of the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3, we can prove that rules that satisfy a version of Arrow's Axiom of Choice (defined over feasible assignments) are immune to such manipulations.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a framework that departs from proposed by Roth et al. we assume that patients do not know other patients' reservation values, but they do know the probability distribution from which they are drawn. Since we deal with probabilities we need to consider not only their preferences over kidneys (assignments) but also their preferences over lotteries on assignments. Hence, in this section, we assume that patients are expected utility maximizers.
A expected utility function is a function u : Ω → R. For each each i ∈ N , P ∈ M n×n , and each r i ∈ R i , u is consistent with patient i preferences if for each
, and for each probability p ∈ [0, 1] and lottery [pω, (1 − p)ω ] which yields kidney ω with probability p and kidney ω with probability (1−p), the utility of the lottery is given by its expected utility pu(ω)+(1−p)u(ω ). Of course, a patient with expected utility u we assume that prefers a lottery [pω, (1 − p)ω ] to any other alternative α (which may or may not be a lottery itself) if and only if pu(ω)
Clearly, v i is consistent with patient i's preferences, but there are many other consistent utility functions, because an expected utility function reflects not only the simple order of her preferences over kidneys, but also a measure of their intensity.
Let F denote a probability distribution over n-tuples of utility functions. We call such a probability distribution a information structure.
Given a preference profile P and a information structure F , a rule ϕ satisfies incentive compatibility if for each r ∈ R truth-telling for all the patients forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game defined by (P, r, ϕ, F ). That is, for each patient i, each r ∈ R, each r i ∈ R i ,and each u i consistent with patient i preferences
Our next result is an impossibility theorem that extends the negative conclusions of Theorem 1. It says that in the incomplete information case, in equilibrium any revelation mechanism cannot satisfy the joint requirements of k-feasibility, constrained efficiency, and individual rationality.
Theorem 2. Let 2 ≥ k < n. There exist preference profiles and states of information [P, F ] for which no rule that satisfies individual rationality,k-efficiency, and incentive compatibility.
Proof. Again, we consider the cases k = 2 and k > 2 separately.
Let k = 2 and consider the deterministic revelation mechanism ϕ that satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and incentive compatibility. Consider three patients, 1, 2, and 3 with preference profile By reporting r 2 = 0.7, patient 2 receives kidney ω 1 . By reporting r 2 = 0.8, she receives ω 3 with probability q and the ω 0 with probability (1 − q). If u 2 (ω 0 ) = 0 and u 2 (ω 3 ) > 1 1−p u 2 (ω 1 ), then patient 2 prefers to report r 2 = 0.8 even though her true reservation value is r 2 = 0.7, which contradicts incentive compatibility.
(ii) ϕ(0.8, 0.7, 0.7) = [(1, ω 2 ), (2, ω 1 ), (3, ω 0 )] and ϕ(0.7, 0.8, 0.7) = [(1, ω 0 ), (2, ω 3 ), (3, ω 2 )].
By reporting r 2 = 0.7, patient 2 receives kidney ω 1 . By reporting r 2 = 0.8, she receives ω 3 . Then, patient 2 always prefers to report r 2 = 0.8 independently of her true reservation value, which contradicts incentive compatibility.
(iii) ϕ(0.8, 0.7, 0.7) = [(1, ω 0 ), (2, ω 3 ), (3, ω 2 )] and ϕ(0.7, 0.8, 0.7) = [(1, ω 0 ), (2, ω 3 ), (3, ω 2 )].
By reporting r 1 = 0.7, patient 1 receives kidney ω 2 with probability q and ω 0 with probability (1 − q) By reporting r 2 = 0.8, she receives ω 0 . Hence, patient 1, always has an incentive to report r 1 = 0.7, which contradicts incentive compatibility.
(iv) ϕ(0.8, 0.7, 0.7) = [(1, ω 0 ), (2, ω 3 ), (3, ω 2 )] and ϕ(0.7, 0.8, 0.7) = [(1, ω 3 ), (2, ω 0 ), (3, ω 1 )].
By reporting r 1 = 0.7, patient 1 receives kidney ω 2 with probability q and ω 3 with 30 probability (1 − q). By reporting r 2 = 0.8, she receives ω 0 . If u 1 (ω 3 ) is close enough to u 1 (ω 0 ) and u 1 (ω 2 ) is large enough, then patient 1 has an incentive to report r 1 = 0.7 even though her true reservation is r 1 = 0.8, which leads to the desired contradiction.
Next, we analyze the general case. Let k > 2. Assume to the contrary there is a rule ϕ that satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and incentive compatibility. Let P be such that for every i = 1 . . . , k:
and for patient k + 1, v k+1 (ω 2 ) > v k+1 (ω 1 ) > v k+1 (ω) = 0 for each ω ∈ Ω \ {ω 1 , ω 2 }.
By individual rationality, without any loss of generality, we can focus on the assignment restricted to the patients 1, . . . , k + 1.
Consider type information distribution F be such that for each i ∈ N \ {k − 1, k + 1}, Prob(v i (ω i+2 < r i < ω i+1 ) = 1, Prob(v k−1 (ω k−1 < r k−1 ≥ ω k ) = p, Prob(v k−1 (ω k+1 < r k−1 < ω k ) = (1 − p), Prob(v k−1 (ω k+1 < r k+1 < ω 2 ) = q, and Prob(v k+1 (ω 2 < r k+1 < ω 1 ) = (1 − q).
Consider patient k − 1. By reporting r k−1 ∈ (v k−1 (ω k−1 , ω k+1 )), for λ ∈ {0, 1}, she obtains with probability q, (λω k , (1−λ)ω k+1 ), and with probability (1−q) the kidney ω k+1 .
On the other hand, by reporting r k−1 ∈ (v k−1 (ω k+1 , ω k ), she receives with probability q the kidney ω k and with probability (1 − q) the null kidney ω 0 . Normalizing u k−1 (ω 0 ) = 0, if λ = 0, for all q ∈ (0, 1) there is u k−1 such that u k−1 (ω k ) > 1 q u k−1 (ω k+1 ), which contradicts incentive compatibility. (Note that patient k − 1 with such utility function would rather report a higher reservation value than her true one.) Thus λ = 1. Repeating the same argument with patient k + 1 yields the desired contradiction.
Appendix B: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. It is obvious that if for each patient truth-telling is the unique protective strategy then ϕ is DIPE. Hence, we focus on the converse result. Let ϕ be a DIPE rule. We proceed thrugh a series of steps. 
